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Upload an untrusted document. Receive a PDF rebuilt from pixels, plus a regexp report on the original bytes.
Safety comes from destruction, not detection. Zero regexp hits is not “clean.”
Convert
No job yet. The trusted API never opens the original with a document parser. Conversion runs in a disposable sandbox.
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Preview
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Sign
A visual mark on the safe PDF. Not a cryptographic signature. The stored file stays unchanged.
Place it on the page.
Draw or type a signature, then click a page in the preview.
The contract
0
parsers on the trusted plane
The original file is opened only inside an isolated sandbox. Pixel reconstruction cannot carry JavaScript, macros, embedded executables, or most metadata.
The regexp pass lists raw byte indicators such as
/JavaScript, /Launch, or
vbaProject.bin.
A hit does not mean that construct was present.
Absence of patterns is not a malware verdict. Conversion still runs.
Questions
BluePaper turns an untrusted document into a safe PDF. It opens the original only inside a disposable, network-isolated sandbox, renders every page to pixels, and rebuilds a new PDF from those pixels on the trusted side.
Anything that is not visible on the rendered page: JavaScript, macros, embedded files, attachments, form fields, clickable links, and most metadata. What you can see stays, including a suspicious link or QR code printed on the page.
No. The report lists raw byte indicators in the original file. Compression and encodings can hide them, and a hit does not prove an active construct was present. Safety comes from the pixel rebuild, not from the report.
The web console is free to use after a human check. BluePaper is AGPL-3.0 software, a network-service fork of Dangerzone, and its corresponding source is on GitHub.